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Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?
Cass R. Sunstein,*  David Schkade,** and Daniel Kahneman***
For those interested in the effects of law on human behavior,
deterrence is of course the central question. No one doubts that legal
sanctions, civil and criminal, can have significant behavioral
consequences. Thus the economic theory of punishment in general,
and of punitive damages in particular, is designed to ensure optimal
deterrence of private and public misconduct. Emphasizing this
point, many observers have suggested that participants in the legal
system should be asked to choose among punishments by answering
explicit questions about how to achieve optimal deterrence.1 To take
just one illustration, Polinsky and Shavell have gone so far to offer a
model jury instruction, one that would direct jurors to focus their
attention on the probability that the defendant’s act would be
detected.2
Extending and elaborating on the standard law-and-economics
wisdom on this topic, Polinsky and Shavell urge that the principal
purpose of punitive awards is to make up for the shortfall in
compensatory damages, a shortfall caused by the failure of potential
plaintiffs to detect the injury and to seek compensation. Polinsky
and Shavell would ask jurors to multiply the compensatory award by
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1 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S
Cal L Rev 79 (1982); William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic
Structure of Tort Law 160-63 (1987); Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages for
Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 Ala L Rev 1143 (1989).
2 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1999).
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the probability that injured persons would not detect and receive
compensation for the injury.3 Thus, for example, no punitive award
should be permitted when the probability of compensation is 100%,
and the compensatory award should be doubled when the probability
is 50%.4 Polinsky and Shavell object that in the real world, jurors do
not attempt to promote optimal deterrence; their jury instruction is
designed to move juror performance in that direction.5
An obvious question raised by proposals of this kind is whether
jurors are able or willing to carry out the relevant tasks. Perhaps it is
unlikely that jurors could master the complex causal issues involved in
making ex ante probability judgments; hindsight bias, for example,
might contaminate the inquiry (causing artificially diminished
awards).6 But even more basic questions are whether citizens
generally would approve of this approach to punitive damages, and
whether jurors would be willing to perform this task if asked to do
so. Previous research suggests that people’s judgments about punitive
damage awards are a reflection of outrage at the defendant’s actions
rather than of deterrence.7 This is not to say that people do not care
about deterrence; of course they do. Our hypothesis here is that they
                                                
3 Id. at 957-62.
4 There are some qualifications here. Polinsky and Shavell would also allow
punitive damages to force the defendant to disgorge socially illicit gains; here
the purpose would allow be to promote optimal deterrence by ensuring that the
defendant, if an individual, is not able to profit from (illicit) hedonic gains
from, say, an assault or rape. Id. at 909-10, 954. Note also that it is possible to
imagine routes to optimal deterrence that diverge from the conventional
“multiplier” approach. See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principle and its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming
1999). These and other qualifications are essentially irrelevant to our claims
here.
5 See id.
6 See Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U Chi L Rev (1998) ; Reid Hastie, David Schkade and John
Payne, Juror judgments in civil cases: Hindsight effects on punitive liability
judgments. Law and Human Behavior (1999).
7 See Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Torty Law, 7 J Risk and Uncertainty 17
(1993); Jonathan Baron, R. Gowda, and Howard Kunreuther, Attitudes toward
Managing Hazardous Waste: What Should be Cleaned Up and Who Should
Pay for It, 13 Risk Analysis 183 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman,
and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages, 107 Yale LJ 2071 (1998).
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do not attempt to promote optimal deterrence; for this reason they
do not make the kinds of distinctions that are obvious, even second-
nature, for those who study deterrence questions. Above all, they
may not believe that in order to ensure optimal deterrence, the
amount that a given defendant is required to pay should be increased
or decreased depending on the probability of detection , a central
claim in the economic analysis of law.8
In this paper we discuss two studies designed to test whether
people believe in optimal deterrence. In the first study, we focus
people’s attention on the probability of detection, in order to see
how this variable influences their judgments. If people do not
attempt to promote optimal deterrence, this factor would be viewed
as largely irrelevant (a point that we qualify below). This finding
would in turn have implications for the role of juries in
implementing deterrent goals. If optimal deterrence is the purpose of
some legal reform, that purpose could be met with resistance in the
jury system. If optimal deterrence is the goal of legal reform, it may
be necessary to rely on less populist institutions, such as regulatory
agencies.
In the second study, we ask the optimal deterrence question
more directly. We present subjects with the question whether it is
proper, or fair, for public officials (including judges) to vary the
degree of punishment with the probability of detection. We ask
whether it is proper for judges to refuse to allow punitive damages
when the probability of detection is 100%, and also whether the
Internal Revenue Service should increase penalties when a smaller
number of agents means that there will be a larger degree of
undetected tax cheating. Compared to the first study, this is a more
straightforward test of the question whether people want optimal
deterrence. If people reject explicit official decisions to vary
punishment with the probability of detection, it is safe to include
that they do not believe in achieving optimal deterrence.
                                                
8 See Polinsky and Shavell, supra note; Landes and Posner, supra note. A low
probability of detection might, however, suggest stealthiness, and for that
reason increase the penalty in certain circumstances, because it increases
outrage. See below. We have not tested that question here.
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I. Background
Outside of the context of punitive damages, psychological work
on punishment has suggested that when thinking about
punishment, people are not simple consequentialists, and that their
ideas about punishment diverge from what would be expected from
an optimal deterrence approach. For example, Baron and Ritov
studied people’s judgments about penalties in tort cases involving
harms resulting from the use of vaccines and birth control pills.9 In
one case, subjects were told that the result of a higher penalty would
be to make companies try harder to make safer products. In an
adjacent case, subjects were told that the consequence of a higher
penalty would be to make the company more likely to stop making
the product, with the result that less safe products would be on the
market. Most subjects, including a group of judges, gave the same
penalties in both cases.
A related study found no reduction in penalty even when
subjects were told that the amount of the penalty would have no
effect on future behavior—because the penalty was secret, the
company had insurance, and the company was about to go out of
business.10 While not directly tied to the topic of optimal deterrence,
these studies strongly suggest that intuitive punishment judgments
are not tailored to consequentialist goals.
Another test of punishment judgments asked subjects,
including judges and legislators, to choose penalties for dumping
hazardous waste.11 In one case, the penalty would make companies
                                                
9 Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J Risk and Uncertainty 17
(1993).
10 See id.
11 Jonathan Baron, R. Gowda, and Howard Kunreuther, Attitudes toward
Managing Hazardous Waste: What Should be Cleaned Up and Who Should
Pay for It, 13 Risk Analysis 183 (1993). There is, in fact, a large literature
documenting that deterrence considerations do not explain public opinion
toward punishment, even when members of the public say that “deterrence” is
their primary concern.  See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for
the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude, 17
L. & Soc'y Rev. 21 (1982); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross,
Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty, 50 J. Soc.
Issues 19 (1994).
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try harder to avoid waste. In another, the penalty would lead
companies to cease making a beneficial product. Most people did not
penalize companies differently in the two cases. Perhaps most
strikingly, people preferred to require companies to clean up their
own waste, even if the waste did not threaten anyone, instead of
spending the same amount to clean up far more dangerous waste
produced by another, now-defunct company.
These studies indicate that when assessing punishment, people
do not focus solely on social consequences, at least not in any simple
way. If this is true, it is reasonable to think that people also do not
attempt to promote optimal deterrence. But this proposition has not
been tested. We attempt to make some progress on the question
here, above all by asking people to focus on a key variable: the
probability of detection.
II. Study 1
The Irrelevance of Probability of Detection
A. Design and Sample
The first study offered three personal injury cases (see
Appendix) to test the effect of explicitly varying the probability of
detection on juror judgments. The question we examined was
whether people would offer different judgments about penalty levels
when the probability of detection was varied. In one case, for
example, the plaintiff suffered serious post-operative complications
after surgery on his broken leg. He claimed that the surgeon was
incompetent, and sued the owner of the hospital. The hospital had
previously received several complaints about the surgeon, but had not
disciplined him. Compensatory damages had already been awarded.
Three versions of each case were prepared. These differed only
in the relative frequency of detection, which was set at 1 out of 100,
1 out of 10, or 1 out of 5. The level of compensatory damages was
the same for all cases ($200,000) as was firm size (annual profits of
around $150 million). Here, for example, is the relevant wording for
one of the cases:
“In situations like this, victims who deserve
compensation do not always receive it because (1) they
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don’t know what caused their problem and therefore
don’t sue, (2) they don’t know that they can sue, or (3)
they sue and lose, even though they deserve to win
under the law, because their lawyers are not good
enough. Research has shown that in only 1 out of 100
situations where someone has an experience like Joan
Glover is the company eventually required to pay
compensation to the victim.”
Note that several features of this design were specifically selected
in order to enhance the likelihood that respondents would use,
rather than ignore, the information provided on the probability of
detection. Both firm size and compensatory damages were held
constant, and these were the only other quantitative factors
presented; moreover, a quantitative response was required. Thus the
design drew attention to the only number that varied between cases,
the probability of detection, increasing the chance that it would be
thought relevant. The probability information was also provided in
the form of relative frequencies, which are more easily understood
and processed than decimals. Jurors were specifically directed to
deterrence (as well as retribution) in the jury instructions (see
Appendix). Note also that our purpose, in this study, was not to ask
directly whether the legal system should pursue optimal deterrence,
nor to see if people could or would pay attention to probability of
detection if required to do so, but instead to examine whether
information on that question would be used appropriately if provided
and emphasized. Any answer would tell us a great deal about people’s
intuitive approach to punishment questions.
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of nine conditions,
which were constructed to ensure that (1) each respondent judged
all three cases, (2) each respondent judged all three levels of
probability of detection, (3) across respondents, all nine
combinations of case and probability of detection were equally
represented in each of the three ordinal positions (first, second,
third). The design is summarized in Table 3 (in the Appendix).
A total of 699 jury-eligible citizens from Phoenix, Arizona were
recruited and paid by a survey firm. Session sizes varied from 23 to 29
and were held in conference rooms of local hotels. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the nine conditions described above,
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resulting in the sample allocation in Table 3 in the Appendix. The
data were analyzed using a repeated measures analysis of variance,
with probability of detection, case, and sequence as independent
variables, along with a subject factor. Because the award distribution
is severely right skewed, as is typical of punitive damages awards,12
the natural log of awards was used as the dependent variable.
B. Results and Implications
The basic result was both striking and simple. Changes in the
probability of detection did not produce significant changes in dollar
awards, even though it was varied by a factor of 20; this was
apparently irrelevant to their dollar judgments (Table 1). 13 To be
sure, there does appear to be a positive trend in the means, but this
difference is not statistically significant (F(2,1336) = 0.5, p > .50),
and even if it were, it is in the opposite direction of that required by
the deterrence argument: The greater the likelihood of detection,
the higher the award. The clear implications of this result are (1)
that explicitly drawing people’s attention to a low probability of
detection does not by itself produce higher or materially different
awards and (2) that optimal deterrence is, to that important extent,
not promoted by people’s spontaneous judgments about appropriate
punishment.
Nothing said here excludes the possibility that if specifically
required to think about issues of optimal deterrence, as urged by
Polinsky and Shavell, jurors might be willing to do so. Study 1 does
not demonstrate that the proposed Polinsky-Shavell jury instruction
would necessarily be met with a form of civil disobedience. It
remains possible that people do care about deterrence but do not
understand the relationship between probability of detection and
(optimal) deterrence; perhaps they are confused about how best to
deter. Perhaps they do not understand the risk of overdeterrence and
                                                
12 See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note.
13 When interpreting a non-significant result as meaningful it is important to
be sure that enough statistical power was present. Note that we did find
significant effects of case (F(2,1336) = 4.7, p < .01), sequence (F(2,1336) = 9.1, p
< .001), and a case by sequence interaction (F(2,1336) = 5.2, p < .01). It is
therefore clear that we had sufficient statistical power(with over 2000 total
observations) to detect any effect of probability of detection if one in fact
existed.
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 8
underdeterrence and might be willing to think in these terms if the
concepts were explained. Nor did we undertake a within-subjects
test of the sort described in Part I; we do not know whether
respondents, confronted with two cases, otherwise identical but
with different probabilities of detection, would treat the two cases in
the same way. And while the first study tests whether jurors will
take account of the low probability of detection when prominently
placed before them, it does not ask for reactions to officials or
institutions who have done exactly that. Our second study sheds
some light on these issues.
Table 1
Mean $ Awards by Case and Probability of Detection*
Probability of Detection
Case 1/100 1/10 1/5 Overall
Glover 677,399 736,139 929,608 773,987
Fredericks 1,139,891 906,100 920,564 983,423
Elegin 924,769 1,380,454 1,210,860 1,156,628
Overall 893,769 973,268 1,012,069 958,420
* These figures are derived from the mean log awards used in the
analysis of variance.  To make the figures more easily interpreted, the
mean log award for each cell was converted to $ by taking the
inverse.  For example, the mean log award for the Glover case with a
1/100 probability was 13.426, and e13.426  = 677,399.
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III. Study 2
Do People Accept Optimal Deterrence Policies?
A. Introduction, Method, Stimuli
The first study did not expressly ask people whether optimal
deterrence policies were appropriate or proper. In our second study,
we asked University of Chicago Law School students to answer this
question. The general hypothesis was that most people would reject
optimal deterrence policies if chosen by an administrative agency or
by a district court. The University of Chicago Law School, however,
would seem to be extremely unfavorable terrain for this hypothesis.
University of Chicago Law School students generally learn a great
deal about deterrence theory in their first year of law school, and
they study optimal deterrence in their required courses about the law
of tort and criminal law. Thus training in the first year of law school
alerts University of Chicago students to the possibility of over- or
underdeterrence and to the need to consider both level and
probability of penalty in achieving optimal deterrence. It would
therefore be reasonable to speculate that a large percentage of
students would accept optimal deterrence theory. But the speculation
would be wrong.
Two questions were presented to 84 students in the first session
of a general administrative law class, taken by both second-year and
third-year students. The questions involved enforcement policy and
punitive damages. The question involving enforcement policy was
this:
“Suppose that the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has a large number of agents per 10,000
people in California, but a small number of agents
per 10,000 people in Utah; suppose too that because
of practical constraints, the IRS cannot increase the
number of agents in Utah. Suppose that you are
head of the IRS, and that your second-in-command
has sent you a memorandum saying, ‘To make up for
the shortfall of agents in Utah, ensure the right level
of deterrence, we need to impose higher penalties for
tax violations in Utah than for tax violations in
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California. I recommend that you adopt a policy to
this effect.’ Putting aside purely political
considerations, would you agree with this policy?”
The question involving punitive damages was this:
“Tom Johnson, a construction worker, was
severely injured as a result of grotesquely reckless
safety practices by his employer. In the trial,
uncontradicted experts testified that Johnson’s
employer ‘did not even try to take the most minimal
and obvious precautions to protect workers against
serious risks to life and health.’ The jury awarded
Johnson $50,000 in compensatory damages and
$300,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge set
aside the punitive award on the ground that ‘there
was essentially no chance that Johnson would not
seek and receive compensation, and hence there is
no need for punitive damages in this case.’ Assume
that the trial judge was correct on his factual
claim—and thus that there was no chance that
Johnson would not seek and receive full
compensation. Do you agree that punitive damages
should not be awarded?”
Respondents were asked to give one of four answers to these
questions: strongly disagree (1), somewhat disagree (2), somewhat
agree (3), strongly agree (4). (Note that we did not ask whether the
result was “fair,” believing that this formulation might bias answers
against optimal deterrence policies.) The question order was varied;
about half of respondents answered the IRS question first, and
about half answered it second. Since it seemed that an unusual
number of respondents, having been schooled in optimal deterrence
policies, would accept those policies, we also asked a follow-up
question for each problem. The question was whether most other
people would agree with the policy. Thus, each participant gave four
responses, all on a 1-4 disagree-agree scale: Self and Other ratings
for both the IRS and punitive damages questions.
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B. Results and Comments
The simplest statement of the result is that very strong
majorities of respondents rejected optimal deterrence policies in both
settings, disagreeing with both the IRS policy and the punitive
damage ruling. More particularly, 84% rejected the judge’s decision
to set aside the punitive damage award, and 75%, rejected the IRS’
policy. Substantial majorities believed that most other people would
also reject the optimal deterrence policy—67% of respondents said
that most people would disagree with the punitive damage
judgment, and 87% of respondents said that most people would
disagree with the IRS policy. In short, substantial majorities both
rejected the optimal deterrence approach and believed that most
people would reject the optimal deterrence approach.
The overwhelming majorities with respect to the punitive
damage judgment are especially noteworthy. Respondents at the
University of Chicago Law School are well aware of the economic
theory of punitive awards. They apparently rejected that theory with
the thought that reckless or invidious behavior deserves to be
punished, whatever deterrence theory may suggest. Hence the
respondents’ refusal to accept optimal deterrence theory provides
some information about the content of punitive intuitions: In
general, moral judgments about inappropriate behavior are affected
little or not at all by the probability of detection.
There is an interesting wrinkle in the findings: More people
disapproved of the punitive damages judgment than believed that
most people would disapprove of the punitive damage judgment. It is
not clear how to account for this. But subsequent informal
discussion suggested a possible explanation: A small group of
students who disagreed with the judge’s decision to set aside the
punitive award believed that because of the publicity given to
apparently excessive punitive awards, most people would approve of a
judge’s decision to set aside any such award.
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Table 2


















IRS Self 42 21 18 3 1.79 75.0%
IRS Other 43 30 10 1 1.63 86.9%
Punitive
Damage
Self 40 31 10 3 1.71 84.5%
Punitive
Damage
Other 26 30 24 4 2.07 66.7%
Overall 44.9% 33.3% 18.5% 3.3% 1.80 78.3%
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C. Implications and Puzzles
The obvious implication of this study is that people generally
reject optimal deterrence policies. The IRS example is a
conventional regulatory effort to increase penalties because of the
low probability of detection; the punitive damage case is a
conventional application of conventional optimal deterrence theory.
If even University of Chicago Law School students reject optimal
deterrence approaches by a substantial margin, there is no reason to
expect, and every reason to doubt, that such policies would obtain
majority or even significant support elsewhere.14
Several questions might be asked about the implications of these
findings. In the IRS study, the question asked about an IRS increase
in penalties because of a lower probability of detection in Utah.
Would people’s answers shift if respondents were asked about an
IRS decrease in penalties because of a higher probability of detection
in California?15 In other words, the answers may have been affected
not only by the (apparently unjustified) inequality between citizens
of Utah and citizens of California, but also because of a framing
effect in which the former were being subjected to what might seem
to be unusually high penalties. Perhaps a different framing of the
question would produce a shift in answers. Or perhaps the key
problem in the IRS case was the evident inequality between similarly
situated citizens. Would respondents reject an optimal deterrence
policy if it was global—if, for example, an administrative agency
increased penalties in 2001 because of reduced enforcement
                                                
14 In light of the unambiguous support for our hypothesis—that people reject
optimal deterrence policies—in this unfavorable population, any study with the
general juror pool would add little for our limited purpose here, which is to
show that in their intuitive punishment judgments, people do not attempt to
promote optimal deterrence. Of course this is not to deny the value of
obtaining more information about the judgments of diverse groups, including
large samples of ordinary citizens (as in Study 1); such information could
produce a great deal of further information about intuitive punishment
judgments, as discussed below.
15 There is also a question whether the effect we find is partly an “IRS
effect”—that antipathy of the IRS helps drive disapproval of the policy. We
cannot rule out this possibility. But it is quite doubtful that the result would be
substantially different if (say) the Environmental Protection Agency or the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration were substituted for the IRS.
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resources, or if a new agency offered high penalties because of
underfunding?
Similarly, the punitive damages problem involved a judicial
elimination of the jury award because of a 100% probability of
detection, an outcome that apparently seemed outrageous to many
respondents. It is easy to imagine a case in which the judge increases
the penalty because the probability of detection was (say) 10%. We
know from Study 1 that such an increase would not occur to jurors
spontaneously. But how many people would find this outcome
unacceptable?
These are important questions, and some answers would give
more precise information about the psychology of punishment. But
they do not bear on the general issue pursued here, which is whether
people attempt to promote optimal deterrence. Even if variations in
the cases might increase the number of people willing to approve of
some probability-penalty tradeoff, it would not follow that optimal
deterrence policies fit comfortably with moral intuitions. We have
offered considerable evidence that they do not. The fact that optimal
deterrence policies are rejected in both the administrative and the
judicial domains, among a group most likely to be predisposed in
their favor, strongly suggests that any effort to move in the direction
of optimal deterrence would encounter strong popular resistance.
The claims that people do not attempt to promote optimal
deterrence policies, and that they are likely to reject many such
policies, raise two further issues. The first has to do with the
structure (if any) of people’s judgments, if those judgments are not
based on the idea of optimal deterrence. In previous work we have
started to develop a descriptive model of punitive damages, with
implications for punishment judgments in general. 16 The essential
claim is that punitive awards emerge from a cascade of judgments,
moving from outrage to punitive intent to dollar awards. The
evaluative aspect of outrage can be measured on bounded numerical
scales, and even within diverse demographic groups, there is
considerable uniformity in outrage judgments, thus measured.17
                                                
16 See Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass R. Sunstein, Shared
Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. Risk
& Uncertainty (1998); Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note.
17 See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, 107 Yale LJ at 2097-2100.
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Punitive intent, which can also be measured on bounded numerical
scales, is determined both by outrage and by additional factors, such
as harm, which do not affect outrage itself. Dollar awards emerge
from a combination of punitive intent and still additional factors,
such as firm size, which do not themselves affect punitive intent
(measured on a bounded numerical scale).
It should be clear that as described, the outrage model does not
incorporate any effort to seek optimal deterrence. But as we have
noted, it remains possible that a low probability of detection would
affect outrage, not because deterrence requires severe punishment,
but because a stealthy act is more outrageous than one that is out in
the open. We suspect that if the probability of detection sometimes
matters—if a low or for that matter high probability drives up dollar
awards—it is because of the increased outrage elicited by a stealthy or
shameless act. It would be feasible, for example, to examine whether
people would offer higher awards when the defendant’s conduct was
extremely open and thus indicated a kind of obliviousness to
widespread social norms; it would equally be possible to explore
whether people would offer higher awards when a defendant took
careful (fiendish?) steps to conceal his wrongdoing. From the
standpoint of retribution, and outrage, it is not clear, in the abstract,
whether a defendant should be deemed stealthy and sneaky, and
hence more severely punished when the probability of detection is
low, or instead deemed shameless, and hence more severely punished
when the probability of detection is high. It is reasonable to think
that outrage, and hence dollar awards, might be increased through
cases that exemplify either phenomenon.
The second issue has to do with the relationship between our
findings and the real world of punitive damages. Here the question
is whether juries tend to increase awards because the probability of
detection was low. There is no evidence that this happens, and
considerable reason to believe that it does not. Those who claim that
punitive awards are predictable show that the compensatory award
tends to “anchor” the punitive award, that is, the punitive award is
much affected by the compensatory award.18 Juries do not add a
special multiplier when the probability of compensation is low, nor
                                                
18 See Thedore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
Legal Stud. 623 (1997); Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, J. Law & Econ.
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do they refuse to go beyond the compensatory award when the
probability is 100%. Polinsky and Shavell themselves give a number
of examples of cases in which the probability of detection did not
matter and suggest that judicial determinations “do not reflect in any
clear manner the formula that achieves optimal deterrence.”19 We
agree that the inevitably messy real-world data show that juries do
not pursue optimal deterrence. What we have added is less messy
evidence that people do not promote optimal deterrence even when
given information that would enable, even encourage them to do
so—and also that people reject optimal deterrence policies in
important settings.
IV. Conclusions
People do not spontaneously think in terms of optimal
deterrence and indeed they would be reluctant to accept effort to
build the law on the foundation of optimal deterrence theory. Their
proposed punishments do not differ depending on the probability of
deterrence, even when this factor is specifically drawn to their
attention. In addition, people reject law enforcement policies that
increase or decrease penalties because of the probability of detection.
These findings have several implications.
First: Serious practical issues would be raised by any effort to
require ordinary people to think in terms of optimal deterrence. Any
such effort could run up against widely held moral intuitions. This
does not mean that people will not obey the law. But there is a
serious risk that a jury instruction asking jurors to think in terms of
optimal deterrence would not be followed in the real world.
Second: The public will be skeptical of an effort to base law
enforcement policy on principles of optimal deterrence. An attempt
to move policy in this direction could be widely perceived as unfair
and wrong. Even if the perception is naïve or ignorant—and we
take no stand here on the normative question—it is important for
policymakers to know about it.
Third: If government is going to base its enforcement policy on
the idea of optimal deterrence, it has several alternatives. It might
keep its policy quiet. Alternatively, it might attempt to educate the
                                                
19 See Polinsky and Shavell, supra note, at 897; see also 897-904.
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public, so as to convince people that this is, in fact, the proper
strategy. Or it might use optimal deterrence policies in settings in
which they can be “framed” so as to fit most comfortably with moral
intuitions.20 Perhaps more promisingly, it might use less populist
institutions to promote the relevant goals. It might, for example,
shift decisional authority away from juries and toward bureaucracies,
with the knowledge that whatever ordinary people think, the
relevant administrators will seek to promote optimal deterrence.
                                                
20 We have suggested several possibilities above, though we have not
investigated them here.
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Appendix
Study 1 Design Summary
Order Case P(detect) Condition N
1 Glover 1 in 100
2 Fredericks 1 in 10 PD1 78
3 Elegin 1 in 5
1 Glover 1 in 10
2 Fredericks 1 in 5 PD2 78
3 Elegin 1 in 100
1 Glover 1 in 5
2 Fredericks 1 in 100 PD3 78
3 Elegin 1 in 10
1 Fredericks 1 in 5
2 Elegin 1 in 100 PD4 77
3 Glover 1 in 10
1 Fredericks 1 in 100
2 Elegin 1 in 10 PD5 77
3 Glover 1 in 5
1 Fredericks 1 in 10
2 Elegin 1 in 5 PD6 77
3 Glover 1 in 100
1 Elegin 1 in 10
2 Glover 1 in 5 PD7 78
3 Fredericks 1 in 100
1 Elegin 1 in 5
2 Glover 1 in 100 PD8 78
3 Fredericks 1 in 10
1 Elegin 1 in 100
2 Glover 1 in 10 PD9 78
3 Fredericks 1 in 5
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Instructions and Stimuli
Juror Instructions (excerpts)
In this study we would like you to imagine that you are a juror
for a legal case in a civil court. Civil law suits involve disputes
between private individuals, companies, or individuals and
companies, in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant harmed
them in some way. The primary purpose of a civil suit brought by a
plaintiff is to seek compensation from the defendant for the alleged
harm.
Civil suits involve two different types of potential damages that
a defendant could be could be required to pay. Compensatory  damages
are intended to fully compensate a plaintiff for the harm suffered as a
result of the defendant’s actions. Punitive damages are intended to
achieve two purposes: (1) to punish the defendant for unusual
misconduct, and (2) to deter the defendant and others from
committing similar actions in the future.
Punitive damages should be awarded if a preponderance of the
evidence shows that the defendants acted either maliciously or with
reckless disregard for the welfare of others. Defendants are
considered to have acted maliciously if they intended to injure or
harm someone. Defendants are considered to have acted with
reckless disregard for the welfare of others if they were aware of the
probable harm to others but disregarded it, and their actions were a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a normal person would
use.
Civil suits differ from criminal cases, in which the government
prosecutes an individual or a company for alleged violations of the
law. Plaintiffs in a civil trial must prove their claim by “a
preponderance of the evidence,” which means that it is more likely
than not that the plaintiff’s claim is justified. This differs from
criminal trials, where the prosecution must prove the defendant’s
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is a much stronger level of
proof.
Please imagine that you are a member of the jury for this case.
Your job is to decide whether and how much the defendant should
be punished, in addition to paying compensatory damages. In the
case you will consider, the jury has already ordered the defendant to
Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics 20
pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff. This does not necessarily
mean that punitive damages must also be awarded. Whether or not
punitive damages should be awarded and if so how large they should
be is completely separate from compensatory damages.
Glover v. General Assistance
Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large number of
pills of a non-prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree. The
Allerfree bottle carried a label reading "Childproof Cap", but it did
not meet federal regulations for the use of that label. Joan's parents
testified that they had been very careful in ensuring that all of their
medications had childproof safety caps. Joan found the pills in a
kitchen drawer and ingested most of the bottle. The overdose
permanently weakened her respiratory system, which will make her
more susceptible to breathing-related diseases such as asthma and
emphysema for the rest of her life, and may reduce her life
expectancy.Joan's parents sued the manufacturer of Allerfree, the
General Assistance company, a drug manufacturer with annual
profits of around $150 million. Internal company documents
showed that General Assistance had chosen to ignore federal
regulations about the standards for using the label "childproof cap".
An internal memo presented at trial says that "this stupid,
unnecessary federal regulation is a waste of our money"; it
acknowledges the risk that Allerfree might be punished for violating
the regulation but says "the punishments are extremely mild;
basically we'd be asked to improve the safety caps in the future." The
trial jury ordered General Assistance to pay the Glovers $200,000 in
compensatory damages for the harm done to Joan's health.
In situations like this, victims who deserve compensation do not
always receive it because (1) they don’t know what caused their
problem and therefore don’t sue, (2) they don’t know that they can
sue, or (3) they sue and lose, even though they deserve to win under
the law, because their lawyers are not good enough. Research has
shown that in only 1 out of 5 situations where someone has an
experience like Joan Glover is the company eventually required to pay
compensation to the victim. As you have seen, the trial jury has
already ordered General Assistance to pay the plaintiff the Glovers
$200,000 in compensatory damages as full compensation for the
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harm suffered. As a member of the punishment jury for this case,
your job now is to decide how much in punitive damages (if any)




What amount of punitive damages (if any) should General
Assistance be required to pay as punishment and to deter them and
others from similar actions in the future? Compensatory damages do
not count as part of the punishment. Please write the appropriate
amount of punitive damages in the blank below.
$ _____________________
Fredericks v. HealthServe Corp.
Tom Fredericks suffered serious post-operative complications
after surgery on his broken leg. He claimed that the surgeon was
incompetent, and sued the owner of the hospital, HealthServe
Corporation, a national health care company with annual profits of
$150 million.Normally, the type of operation Fredericks had involves
only minor initial pain, and after two months the leg is completely
healed. However, Fredericks was in excruciating pain for three
months, and was on crutches for six months. He still has difficulty
sitting for long periods, and experiences muscle spasms and
swelling.Evidence presented at trial showed that the surgeon hurried
through the operation by leaving out certain standard medical
precautions. HealthServe had previously received several complaints
about the surgeon, but had not disciplined him. A former secretary
testified that a manager said, “So he makes a few mistakes; he does
more operations per day than other doctors, and that helps our
bottom line. Besides, he hasn’t killed anyone yet.” The trial jury
ordered HealthServe to pay Fredericks $200,000 in compensatory
damages.
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Elegin v. T & C Components
Paul Elegin was seriously injured in an automobile accident
which occurred when his steering malfunctioned. He claimed that
the cause of the accident was a defectively designed steering system
and sued the manufacturer, T & C Components.Although he was
wearing his seatbelt, Elegin suffered a broken pelvis and a severely
fractured cheekbone, both of which required surgery. He was in
severe pain for six months as his pelvis healed. The cheekbone injury
permanently disfigured his face, and he has frequent and debilitating
migraine headaches.T & C Components, a company with annual
profits of $150 million, is a major supplier of parts to the largest auto
manufacturers in the country. Internal company research reports
presented at trial include the statement “the steering system may be
subject to dangerous malfunction on variable road surfaces.
Recommend retest and possible redesign.” T & C never attempted
to correct or redesign the mechanisms detailed in the reports, or
conduct a retest. A memo stated “engineers worry too
much—testing for everything they think of would be too expensive.”
The trial jury ordered T & C to pay Elegin $200,000 in
compensatory damages.
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